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1. 
“Il n’y a aucun espace réel. C’est une construction purement verbale” (Lacan, 
2005, 86). ‘There is no Real space. It is a purely verbal construction’. In this, rather 
surprising, expression used in the seminar dedicated to Joyce and the concept of 
sinthome, we see how Lacan thought that the problem of space in the Real needed 
to be addressed in a different way than through Euclidean geometry. Topology is 
more the indication of a problem than the discipline that would guarantee us the 
definitive solution, and the question of what “spatiality” would be beyond the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary remains an open one. As Jacques-Alain Miller noted 
regarding this expression in Seminar XXIII, Lacan “invented a geometry of the sexual 
relation that is completely different from the concentric space of the Imaginary” 
(Miller, 2007). In this sense we could claim that the inexistence of the sexual relation, 
as Real, is what pushes us to think differently the problem of spatiality, given that the 
resources that are given to us by the Imaginary are of no use here. Space, at least in 
its geometric-imaginary way, can be thought only on the background of a symbolic 
structure. So what does it mean that space does not exist in the Real? What is the 
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status of the “inexistence of the sexual relation” given that it has no space and no 
written form?  
I understand in this way Alenka Zupančič’s statement that sexuality is a 
philosophical, or even an ontological problem. It is not a matter of elevating 
something crudely material to the level of a high speculation, but rather of taking 
seriously its paradoxical and problematic localization. A minimal psychoanalytic 
definition of sexuality would be ‘that which cannot be reduced to a specific sphere of 
experience that can be analyzed or described’. As Zupančič puts it: “there is no doubt 
that sex exists (and we are pretty well able to recognize, “identify” it); what seems to 
be missing […] is the Idea of sex, its essence” (Zupančič, 2017, 22). And even though a 
brutal commonsensical Freudianism claiming that every symptom could be 
explained with its hidden sexual cause, is still somehow popular, sexuality in 
psychoanalysis means something completely different and somehow 
counterintuitive.  
The hypothesis is that sexuality can be found in every sphere of experience, 
because literally everything can undergo a process of libidinal investment which 
makes it derail and go out of the boundaries of an alleged “good norm”. From food 
(or absence of it, like in anorexia) to physical exercises, from knowledge to drugs, 
every human activity, being symbolically and linguistically mediated, can be 
supplemented and incorporate a minimal degree of sexualization. But why wouldn’t 
this simply be an argument regarding the way through which some “other” activity 
would be added a sexual value? Why would it be an argument regarding the 
impossibility to locate sexuality in “its essence”? If everything can be sexualized, why 
wouldn’t sexuality be in itself, so to speak, “immediately sexual” (and that 
commonsensical Freudianism that predicate that every interpretation of a symptom 
has a sexual content, be true)? In a stand-up sketch by Louis CK, the (in)famous 
comedian gives an involuntary answer to this problem when he asks himself, in a 
rather paradoxical and comic way, where does sexual drive comes from: 
 
Sex drive has to come from somewhere. And it’s not just about sex. Sex has 
something behind and it’s weird cause we ignore it. Sex is really trying to get 
us somewhere… and it’s trying to have a family. We separated those two things 
but the entire reason sex exists is just to have babies. We are such a 
narcissistic species that we have separated them just because we want to 
fuck. It’s really a weird kind of behavior [...] [Deep down] that urge is just the 
urge to procreate. [...] Animals must think we’re idiots. Animals that watch us 
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have sex must be like ‘they don't know what they are doing, this is not how you 
do it’. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGzmc4TTE2I) 
 
 
The explanation is clearly paradoxical but Louis CK in a way is right. It is not 
just that every human activity can undergo a process of sexualization, it is sex itself 
that has been sexualized in the human species. Or better, it is procreation, which 
underwent a process of denaturalization (“we separated those two things”) and 
became something else: it became sex as we know it. Sex is just the outcome of the 
“normal” human activity of procreation being ruined by the parasitical urge to enjoy 
(“we have separated them just because we want to fuck”). This is why we can 
imagine that animals, when looking at us having sex, must really think that we do not 
know what we are doing: in fact we do not know how to properly procreate. And the 
reason is that sex has “plagued” the natural act of procreation and has for ever 
prevented us to have the “right measure” while doing it. So eating, drinking, doing 
sports, smoking cigarettes… and procreation, are all sexualized activities, but 
sexuality in itself, “the idea of sex” as Zupančič puts it, does not have a proper place. 
This is the first philosophical feature of sexuality: its “geometrical problem”; its lacking 
of a place; its impossibility to be delimited and defined.  
Thus “Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel” does not mean that sexuality is a terrain of 
inevitable dissatisfaction and melancholy, doomed to foster resignation and sadness; 
it does not mean that males and females (or any other gender identity) are destined 
to miss their encounter. Every cynical or conservative reading of this Lacanian 
maxim cannot but be completely misplaced. The inexistence of the sexual relation is 
rather the positive affirmation of a persisting and fundamental contradiction in reality. 
For example, sexual difference in Lacanian psychoanalysis should not be understood 
as the difference between two already constituted elements – masculine and 
feminine – but rather as the affirmation that the very field of sexuality cannot be 
composed by “defined entities” and successfully organized in parts. The sexual is 
what establishes a particular relation between the Whole and its Parts and affirms 
that between them there cannot be any reconciliation; it is what prevents to have a 
successful division between the parts and to delimitate their identity. Masculinity or 
femininity are two different attempts which are in themselves already a failure 
because there is no way to say what a masculine sexual identity would be or what a 
feminine one would: it is not possible to have a “partition” or to establish the 
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boundary that circumscribes them. As a result, the Whole cannot be delimited. So 
the Whole does not exist.  
That means that the theory of sexual difference in psychoanalysis is not a 
theory of the division between the sexes nor of the division between different sexual 
positionalities. It is a theory of antagonism: an axiom (because it serves as a premise 
or a starting point for further consequences) that affirms the unsurpassable horizon 
of conflict. It does not state an impossibility but rather a positive proposition: “there is 
no sexual relation” means that “there is antagonism”.  
If, as Zupančič claims, “the sexual” is not a particular sphere of experience but it 
is implicated in every human activity (it is not a part), we should not derive from that 
that it is a meta-concept (it is not a whole), given the prohibition, always re-affirmed 
by Lacan, of relying on an ultimate “discourse of the discourses” that would 
“complete” the structure. Its status is rather similar to what Slavoj Žižek developed in 
many of his books as the difference between the Kantian negative and infinite 
judgment: there is in fact a difference between sexuality not being a whole (negative 
judgment), and non-sexuality, so to speak (or, as Lacan would say, the “inexistence 
of it”), being a meta-concept. If the inexistence of the sexual relation is the inherent 
impossibility of every part to reach its consistency and self-delimitation (the 
sexualization of everything as the enjoying supplement of an incomplete 
circumscription), the necessary consequence is that the Whole, i.e. the meta-
linguistic point of view through which reaching a definitive overview of all the mutual 
delimitation between the parts, would also be necessarily impossible (or, according 
to the infinite judgment, operative as not-Whole). The impossibility to delimitate the 
parts and the impossibility to delimitate the Whole are therefore two sides of the 
same coin. To put it in Lacanese, we could say that the inexistence of the sexual 
relation is the vanishing mediator between The Woman Does Not Exist (the 
inexistence of the part) and the Non-All (the inexistence of the Whole or of the meta-
language).  
The “inexistence of the sexual relation” as the impossibility to delimitate or to 
define the elements, and the “inexistence of a metalanguage” as the impossible 
universal negotiation between them, should be read together. What is important to 
note is that these two axioms should not be limited to their negative form – “sexual 
relation is not”, or “metalanguage is not” – but brought to their infinitive judgment 
form: such as “there is an unsurpassable antagonism”; “there is a non-All”.  
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To sum it up:  
 
Negative Judgment  
 
Infinite Judgment  Affirmative consequence  
There is no sexual relation There is “the inexistence of 
the sexual relation” 
 
There is antagonism  
There is no metalanguage 
 
There is a  
“non-metalanguage” 
There is non-All 
 
 
It is now clear in which sense a Lacanian theory of sexuality has philosophical 
or even ontological consequences. Slavoj Žižek’s latest production, from Less Than 
Nothing to Absolute Recoil, from Disparities to Incontinence of the Void, is a perfect 
example of the philosophical sequitur of the axiom of the inexistence of the sexual 
relation. His argument revolves around the same conceptual shift – from negative 
judgment, to infinite judgment to affirmation –, usually presented by him as the 
passage from Kant to Hegel, or from the epistemological obstacle that separates 
appearances from the In-itself, to ontological impossibility: “the fact that we cannot 
grasp reality as a Whole does not mean that reality as a Whole is beyond our reach, 
it means that reality is in itself non-all, antagonistic, marked by a constitutive 




The intertwined impossibility of the parts and the Whole is a well known 
problem in the Lacanian thought: it is already implied, for instance, in the idea of 
structure. The concept of signifier – the basic element of a structure – is based on the 
idea of its impossible delimitation. We know that the minimal Saussurian definition of 
a signifier chain is that of being based on a system of negative differences without 
positive terms. So what are the characteristics of a single element, such as Signifier 
A? Nothing but being negatively opposed to another element, namely Signifier B. But 
what are the characteristics of the element Signifier B? Nothing but being negatively 
opposed to another element, Signifier A. And so on and so forth. The minimal 
structure of a signifying chain require at least two elements: A and B. It is not possible 
to circumscribe the boundaries of a single element depriving it of its relation with 
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another one. Why? Because none of them can be stable “in itself” if it is not put in an 
opposition with another. That means that every part of the structure is “in itself” 
inconsistent and open: it cannot reach its self-identity or close down its perimeter. 
But that is true for each and every part of the structure. This unending process of 
cross-reference, logically deprived of an anchoring point, create the idea of what 
Lacan calls a metonymical Verschiebung, or “displacement”: the idea that searching 
for the consistency of an element we jump from A to B to C to D to E… or, for the sake 
of logical simplicity, from A to B to A to B to A, and so on. The structure is by definition 
impossible to be “closed”: there is no way to pointing it down to a stabilizing 
foundation. We can derive from that, that the impossibility of every element to reach 
its self-identity is mirrored by the impossibility of the entire structure to map out the 
entire spectrum of the relations between the elements. A part that cannot be 
circumscribed in its identity boundaries is accompanied by a Whole whose 
perimeter is by definition always open.  
This idea of structure was not always the dominant one, not even in that 
macro-field that goes under the name of structuralism. For example Umberto Eco in 
his famous Theory of Semiotics published in 1975 developed a completely different 
idea of structure, despite using, like Lacan, de Saussure as a point of reference. Eco 
though never referred to the Saussurian definition of language as a structure of 
negative differences without positive terms, but, for instance, mentioned a passage 
of the Cours de linguistique générale that goes clearly in an opposite direction where 
de Saussure says that “Language is a system of signs that express ideas, and is 
therefore comparable to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic 
rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc. But it is the most important of all these 
systems” (Eco 1976, 14). Here we have a completely different idea of structure: an 
intelligible closed system, made of well-defined elements that can be used as a ur-
Structure in order to decode and analyze every other system of communication. In 
this Aristotelian understanding of the structure what is missing is precisely the 
obstacle that prevents the parts/elements to reach their self-consistency and the 
meta-linguistic closing gesture of the Whole. This element of dis-equilibrium that 
objects any act of delimitation and definition and makes the entire structure crooked 
is formalized by Lacan with the letter a.  
The status of this paradoxical variable though is not that of an element.  Lacan 
in his later teaching abandons the idea of a as an obstacle/foreign intruder 
heterogeneous to the symbolic machine, and starts to address it as a pure abstract 
logical function of the entirety of the structure. For example when in Seminar XI he 
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develops a theory of the object-gaze, he still defines it as a heterogeneous obstacle 
preventing the consistency of the visual field to be successful, like in the well-known 
example of Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors. When two years later in Seminar 
XIII, L’object de la psychanalyse, he goes back to work on the problem of vision, he 
develops his argument along the line of a structural problem that is no more 
circumscribable in a single point of the scopic field but regards the entirety of it. a is 
no more an element – which would already respond to the demand of externalize the 
incompleteness of the elements/structure or parts/Whole – but the logical function 
which prevents each and every single element to find its own consistency as much 
as the perimeter of the entire structure to be closed down in a Whole. a become the 




Alenka Zupančič stressed this point extensively in What IS Sex?: there is not a 
theory of sexual difference (but at this point we could even call it a theory of the 
“unsurpassable horizon of antagonism”) that is not inherently political. This political 
dimension though does not have anything to do with the merge of sexuality and 
politics that is brought forward by the Freudo-Marxist tradition, where the two series 
are fused in a monistic solution. The inexistence of the sexual relation on the contrary 
is a directly political axiom in itself: we do not have to apply it to an external field. The 
inexistence of the sexual relation is not a part (sex is not a subfield with its own rules 
and positive characteristics) nor a meta-linguistic Whole. It is rather the axiom of a 
logical impossibility implicated in every discursive field. Sexual difference is thus 
already present in the field of politics in the form of the unsurpassable horizon of 
antagonism, and historically this function has a precise name: class struggle.  
Class struggle, at least in the way it has been theorized by few heterodox 
Marxist traditions such as French Althusserianism and Italian Workerism (Tronti, 
Negri, the journal The Red Notebooks) does not have anything to do with the truism 
that society is divided in classes – i.e. different social groups pursuing opposing and 
conflicting interests. According to Mario Tronti for example, the working class as the 
historical social agent of class struggle, is not a sociologically constituted entity or a 
social group defined by some positive features, that can be represented in the field of 
parliamentary democracy with its own claims. It is not the sum of all the workers. Its 
status is that of the dispositif of production of a disequilibrium; the agent of a social 
asymmetry. Class struggle is nothing but the structural place within the capitalist 
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mode of production that “stands in” for the impossible coherence of the whole: it is 
what prevents the social Whole of acquiring a proper coherence.  
The working class cannot be defined through a static and external description 
of the social agents. It exists only in its immanent and concrete political struggles 
when it exposes the truth of the unsurpassable horizon of antagonism in the social 
field. There is no sexual relationship in the field of politics can be simply said with the 
formula “there is no social relation that is not traversed by a fundamental class 
antagonism”, or even “there is no social relation that can be pacified in a Whole”. The 
parts inhabiting the social field are not statically opposing parts in their delimitations 
and boundaries – they are not defined social groups –; they only exist on the 
background of their own impossibility of reaching their “regional” coherence. That is 
why in class struggle the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not two parts of the 
same Whole. The bourgeoisie is a class that presents itself as delimited – i.e. that 
proposes a model of social relations based on the possibility to define once and for 
all the relation between constituted parts. The working class on the other hand fights 
also for its own disappearance, because its struggle is not the struggle for the 
recognition of a defined part, but for the impossibility of the social Whole to find a 
definitive consistency (a struggle for the non-All). More than being two elements, 
bourgeoisie and proletariat are two different political attempts to establish a 
relationship between the parts and the Whole: can the Whole be “closed” and 
defined through a sound circumscription of all the elements of the structure, or are 
the parts and the Whole destined to be traversed by an unsurpassable dimension of 
antagonism? Is it possible that the Whole could have some parts that are related to 
each others based on a mutual definition or is it rather the Whole impossible to 
totalize and therefore traversed by an ineliminable dissemination? 
This is the reason why according to Lacan sexes (as much as classes) are not 
two: there are simply two meta-attempts to deal with the disequilibrium (or the 
unsurpassable antagonism) of the non-relation: either we stand with the ones who 
want to pacify the non-relation with two already-constituted differences (or a 
multiplicity of already-constituted differences, such as in the democratic multiplicity 
of parliamentary democracy) or we stand with the ones who take seriously the 
impossibility of the non-relation and its fundamental antagonism. Zupančič is right to 
point out that capitalism stands not with the former, i.e. the well-organized 
composition of the parts, but with the latter. Capitalism, in this regard, is a highly 
progressive social form because it gives an enormous attention and respect for the 
social conflict and for a highly unbalanced social organization. The organization of 
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value production is an extremely nuanced dispositif of organization of a 
disequilibrium because it bases its production on an impossible closure and 
delimitation of the Whole: producing surpluses is possible only in a mode of 
production where wealth is not something given and static, but where it is constantly 
produced through an unbalanced and dynamic relation between the parts. The law 
of value is thus based on a disequilibrium. It is based on the antagonism between 
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